Response to Commentators by Post, Robert C.
Response to Commentators
Robert Postt
Academic life contains few pleasures more intense than writing for
an audience as astute and as generous as the four commentators to my
Brennan Lecture. As this Response demonstrates, I have learned much
from them, particularly regarding the logical relationship between the
dominant conception and the sociological account. What I chiefly wish to
stress, however, is my deepest gratitude for their constructive and discern-
ing insights.
Tom Grey, for example, makes an excellent and useful point about the
potential tension between the rule of law and what I call in my Lecture the
"sociological approach."' Grey is entirely correct to stress that the insights
yielded by a sociological apprehension of antidiscrimination law could
encourage overly ad hoe and contextualized judgments, which the internal
morality of the law ought properly to resist.
This tension between contextualism and formal consistency, however,
is not entirely new to the law, and we are not without mechanisms for its
ameliorization. In tort law, for instance, where the common law seeks to
reproduce the nuanced and individualized judgments characteristic of
community norms, we typically place decisions in the hands of a jury. Jury
decisions are figured as "merely" factual, and hence as outside of the rule
of law. Juries are deliberately rendered non-accountable and their decisions
are stripped of precedential force. Nevertheless, we do not entirely aban-
don values associated with the rule of law, because judges, in the context
of motions to dismiss or motions for judgment NOV, can simultaneously
facilitate highly contextualized jury decisions and yet confine such deci-
sions within definite limits. Of course juries must also receive judicial
instruction about the standards and criteria that ought to govern their deci-
sions, but judicial instructions are usually phrased at a level of generality
that adroitly reconciles contextualism with formal consistency.2 We have
developed a multitude of legal mechanisms, therefore, for negotiating the
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messy tensions usefully identified by Grey, and perhaps these mechanisms
might also prove helpful in the context of antidiscrimination law.
I also entirely agree with Anthony Appiah's perception that judg-
ments of equality and inequality must ultimately reflect a genuinely moral
perspective capable of convincingly justifying the differential treatment of
persons. I was particularly appreciative of Appiah's incisive parsing of the
idea of a "stereotype." My own use of the word was simple, resting on the
elementary notion of "generalization." But Appiah usefully distinguishes
among "statistical" stereotypes, "false" stereotypes, and "normative"
stereotypes. His discussion reveals how these distinctions can clarify our
apprehension of different cases.
My only reservation derives from the sense that sometimes the dis-
tinction between "statistical" and 'normative" stereotypes does not inhere
in the fact of the matter, but in its apprehension. Often when it is said that
women are "weak" or that they lack "aggression," for example, it is not
clear whether the assertions signify empirical, statistical claims, or whether
they signify instead normative claims about what it means to be a woman.
Stereotypes not infrequently hover ambiguously between these meanings,
sometimes assuming the status of descriptive claims, and sometimes
modulating into what Appiah elegantly terms "scripts for identities."3 It is
thus an achievement, for which Title VII law is partly responsible, to be
able authoritatively to interpret many of these stereotypes as merely
"statistical."
Judith Butler's Response ably exposes and deepens many of the
philosophical themes I had hoped to advance.4 She ultimately raises
the key question of how we can "account for the transformation of the
stereotype within the practice of gender if there were not something else in
gender, as it were, that is not immediately co-opted or foreclosed by the
stereotype."' She worries that
[i]n claiming that race and gender are stable and systematic
features of social reality ... and in claiming that persons cannot
legibly appear to us without these conditions of social appearance
in place, are we perhaps fortifying these categories precisely in
their stereotypicality and persistence? By what means, then, are
they disrupted and revised?6
3. K. Anthony Appiah, Stereotypes and the Shaping of Identity, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 41, 51
(2000).
4. The query that she puts to me-how to account for "those dimensions of personhood that do
not, strictly speaking, appear----is pertinent and important, and certainly beyond the confined scope of
these comments. My guess is that I would want to think about such questions in roughly the way that
Wittgenstein thinks about the issue of pain.
5. Judith Butler, "Appearances Aside," 88 CALIF. L. REV. 55, 60 (2000).
6. Id. at 62.
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These are exactly the right questions to ask, and they have no easy
answers. But in thinking about them I recur to the analogy of language.
The meaning of words depends entirely upon common conventions and
shared understandings--"stereotypes," as it were. But these stereotypes do
not prevent us from transforming language. We can forge new meanings
and alter the conventions by which we script the world. We can speak
poetry instead of prose. But even poetry is expressed within language; it
successfully communicates only because it is always already situated
within the conventions by which meaning as such is constituted.
It is in this sense that I believe that stereotypes "underwrite" the prac-
tice of gender. They do not exhaust the practice, because any given
stereotype is susceptible to change and transformation, in exactly the way
that the meanings of words are susceptible to change. But just as meaning
remains necessarily conventional, so too altering stereotypes merely
revises, rather than eliminates, the content of stereotypes.
Of course gender or race could cease to be relevant categories, the
way that serfdom has ceased to be a relevant category. But the category of
serfdom vanished because the forms of life that made the category perti-
nent disappeared, and I doubt that there is any imminent likelihood of a
similar social transformation about to overtake either race or gender. To
the extent that these categories remain relevant, their meaning will be
underwritten by the shared conventions, the stereotypes, that make social
meaning possible. And this will be true however successfully we seek to
unsettle and revise the received meanings of these stereotypes.
It is possible, however, that Butler's worry may be directed not at the
generic properties of social meaning, but rather at the specific account of
law implicit in my Lecture. It is true that that I speak of law as having spe-
cific articulable purposes. It can fairly be said that I characterize the law as
speaking prose, rather than poetry. But this is because, as Robert Lowell
writes,
[t]he law is a sledgehammer,
not a scalpel.7
The law as an institution is a crude, blunt instrument of public policy. In
part this is a consequence of the law's function, which is to coordinate the
decisions of thousands of government officials and to direct the actions of
millions of private persons. In part it is a consequence of the internal
morality of the law; the rule-of-law values invoked by Tom Grey point
powerfully toward stability, predictability, and internal consistency. And in
part it is a consequence of the fact that important aspects of antidiscrimi-
nation law have a purposive structure; they seek to attain definite objec-
tives.
7. ROBERT LOWELL, Fetus, in DAY BY DAY 34 (1977).
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These factors combine to push antidiscrimination law toward an
internal organization that strives to accomplish discrete, relatively clear,
articulated ends. As a practical matter, therefore, to speak of the efforts of
antidiscrimination law to transform the practices of gender and race is to
speak of its efforts to alter these practices from one form to another. The
ends of antidiscrimination law can and should change over time, which in
practice means that the law will unsettle and progressively revise these
practices. But it is implausible to imagine the law in any given moment as
pursuing anything other than specific objectives.
Of course antidiscrimination law could take as its specific goal the
radical suspension of the practices of gender and race, so as to reveal per-
sons simply as persons, and this may be what Butler has in mind when she
speaks of "unsettling the social conditions by which persons become intel-
ligible at all."'8 Surely Butler is right to stress this admirable aspiration.
Although every person comes to us already enmeshed within the linguistic
significations that define personhood, and to that extent always already
caught within conventional understandings, we have all had the experience
of breaking through stereotypes to acquire a more immediate, vivid, and
seemingly "truer" perception of a person.
But strange things happen to the law when it aspires to this condition.
Something like this aspiration may well lie behind the trope of blindness
that presently controls antidiscrimination law. What I attempted to demon-
strate in my Lecture, however, is that this aspiration does not produce the
kind of "unsettling" that Butler seeks; instead it modifies conventions of
race and gender in ways that are implicit and unconsidered. Because gen-
der and race remain socially salient categories, and because they are likely
to abide despite the best efforts of antidiscrimination law, the trope of
blindness within law does not so much unsettle these practices, as it rede-
fines them. In her extensive Response, Reva Siegel trenchantly argues that
the trope of blindness does not transcend, but instead actively entangles
antidiscrimination law in the actual practices of race and gender. Particu-
larly illuminating is her discussion of the elastic and permeable ways in
which contemporary antidiscrimination law classifies actions and rules as
"based upon" race or gender. These are significant doctrinal and ideologi-
cal mechanisms by which antidiscrimination law regulates its own recog-
nition of the manifold ways in which it intersects with the social practices
of race and gender.
Reva Siegel has, of course, written extensively and profoundly about
the history of race and gender. I have learned much from her pungent and
subtle accounts of the actual operation of antidiscrimination law. In her
8. Butler, supra note 5, at 63.




Response, Siegel argues that race and gender must be understood as condi-
tions of social stratification, and that antidiscrimination law has historically
intervened to dismantle some, but not all, of these conditions. Through the
trope of blindness, antidiscrimination law has paradoxically served to vali-
date certain forms of stratification.
Siegel's argument seems to me largely correct, and I endorse it. But I
would reserve three points of qualification. First, although the concept of
stratification makes a great deal of sense within the core areas of race and
gender, there are other areas of antidiscrimination law where the concept
has less bite. The domain of religion, for example, is at least as venerable
as those of race and gender, yet stratification does not seem a particularly
useful way to understand contemporary American prohibitions against dis-
crimination on the basis of religion. Appiah' s invocation of the problem of
"bigotry""' seems more pertinent. This would also seem to be true with
respect to other areas of antidiscrimination law, such as sexual orientation
or Vietnam Veteran status. There are still other areas of contemporary
antidiscrimination law, however, such as age or marital status, where nei-
ther stratification nor bigotry seem especially relevant. While stratification
may be a useful frame for understanding important aspects of antidiscrimi-
nation law, therefore, it is not comprehensive.
Second, even within the core domains of race and gender, the concept
of stratification may not exhaustively explain the operation of antidis-
crimination law. While I agree that the concept does illuminate exceed-
ingly important dimensions of the relationship of antidiscrimination law to
race and gender, there may remain other facets of this relationship that are
not so centrally elucidated by the concept. Aspects of Title VII's upholding
of conventional dress and grooming codes, for example, may be better
explicable in terms of maintaining heterosexist norms than in terms of
stratification between the sexes.
Third, and most importantly, Siegel's observations concerning strati-
fication suggest an important ambiguity about what is meant by the
"purpose" of antidiscrimination law. I should have stressed more clearly
than I did in my original Lecture that the dominant conception and the
sociological account are not symmetrical concepts. They cannot be substi-
tuted, one for the other. This is because the dominant conception expresses
a moral vision that is internal to the law, while the sociological account
represents an external account of the operation of law. It The dominant con-
ception expresses a "purpose" of the law, but the sociological account does
not.
10. Appiah, supra note 3, at 50.
11. For a discussion of the distinction between internal and external accounts of the law, see Neil
MacCormick, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 275-92 (1978).
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As the work of John Rawls indicates, the trope of blindness has deep
roots in contemporary theories of justice and of morality. If one were to
ask a judge why the law ought to impose a regime of color blindness, she
could reply that it was right and proper for the law to act in ways that
render race invisible. The ideal of color blindness expresses a genuine
moral commitment; it is neither a pretext nor a ruse. That is why the domi-
nant conception functions, as Siegel accurately observes, affirmatively "to
legitimate the distributive regimes that sustain group stratification.' ' 2
My critique of the dominant conception is that it contains an image of
how antidiscrimination law works that systematically masks and distorts
the true operation of the law. This observation is relevant to the question of
whether the dominant conception represents a desirable or adequate ideal
for antidiscrimination law. I proposed the sociological account in order to
provide an external perspective that would make visible how antidiscrimi-
nation law actually functions, and in this way to reveal the inadequacies of
the dominant conception. My suggestion was that we ought seriously to
consider whether to refashion antidiscrimination law to pursue a different
internal ideal, one which takes account of and does not contradict the
insights of the sociological account.
The sociological account cannot by itself provide such an ideal.
Although the shift to an external perspective helps us better to understand
the true effects of our internal purposes, it cannot simply be substituted as
an alternative internal ideal. If a judge were asked to explain her decisions,
she could not respond that she was engaged in a social practice that modi-
fied another social practice. A judge would instead have to articulate an
internal justification for antidiscrimination law that was morally convinc-
ing, that acknowledged the actual interplay between such law and the
social practices of race and gender, and that was defensible in terms of the
particular requirements of legal doctrine. Brennan's rationale in Weber of
breaking down "old patterns of.. .segregation and hierarchy" might, for
example, be a candidate for such a reformulated ideal. 3
The objective for antidiscrimination law that Brennan proposes in
Weber belongs to the class of proposed internal purposes that we would
now call "antisubordination" theories. Siegel eloquently summons the his-
torical genesis and normative attraction of these theories, which challenge
us to dismantle hierarchy, disadvantage, and subordination." As I sug-
gested in my Lecture, antisubordination theories do not seek to transcend
history; they instead conceive law as an institution acting to modify other
12. Siegel, supra note 9, at 83.
13. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,208 (1979).
14. Siegel is, I think. correct to trace the normative structure of these theories to Fiss's "group-
disadvantaging principle." Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pun.
Arr. 107, 108 (1976); Siegel, supra note 9, at 109-10.
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institutions. Unlike the dominant conception, therefore, they do not contra-
dict the very premise of the sociological account.
But the sociological account is nevertheless relevant to the assessment
of antisubordination theories. The power of such theories often flows from
the implicit presumption that there exist independent metrics of hierarchy
or disadvantage, like work or income, which it is the task of antidiscrimi-
nation law to equalize. Although there is surely some truth to this pre-
sumption, it is also clear that in its actual operation antidiscrimination law
does not function in this purely redistributive fashion, even in the relatively
progressive areas of disparate impact analysis and affirmative action. 5
Moreover antidiscrimination law seems in many contexts as much
concerned with defining what should count as hierarchy or disadvantage as
it is with applying any antecedent metric. Antidiscrimination law postu-
lates normatively acceptable social meanings for race and gender, and
these meanings, in turn, color what we perceive as subordination. The area
of sexual harassment law is a particularly fascinating venue for the study of
this dynamic. 6 In such contexts, notions of hierarchy and disadvantage do
not so much measure the practices of race and gender against independent
variables like work and income, as they express conclusions about what the
proper nature of these practices ought to be.
This suggests that a sociological account of the actual operation of
antidiscrimination law will prove important for our understanding of
antisubordination theories. A convincing description of the purposes of
modern antidiscrimination law, as well as of the complex circumstances
that inform its normative postulations, would be, as Siegel's Response and
her historical work surely demonstrate, a hugely daunting task, albeit a
necessary one.
Of course whatever we learn from such a sociological account is not
set in stone. Even if antidiscrimination law is not presently redistributive,
for example, we can change our purposes and hence transfigure the actual
practices of antidiscrimination law. We might in fact most accurately
understand antisubordination theories as proposing just such a normative
transformation. They remind us that we are not bound to repeat the limita-
tions of our history. But in evaluating the promise of such theories, surely
an essential (if modest) first step would be to apprehend the nature of our
own current commitments, as they stand revealed in the actual operation of
our law. It would seem that our capacity for firm and enduring change
would depend upon the potential for such self-knowledge.
15. See, e.g., Barbara . Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE LJ. 2009, 2030-31 (1995).
16. For a fine discussion, see Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49
STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997).
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In this context, I would interpret Siegel's concept of stratification as
an exceedingly useful amplification and elaboration of the sociological
account. It offers a complex and systematic framework for apprehending
the subtle ways in which antidiscrimination law modifies the actual prac-
tices of race of gender. It enables us to grasp in a deeper and more compre-
hensive way the impact of the dominant conception, and hence empowers
us more accurately to evaluate that conception. But, like the sociological
account, it is not itself an internal moral vision capable of guiding the law.
As Siegel herself acknowledges, it is "messy" to apply the concept of
stratification because "it is not always clear what equality looks like.' '7
In my Lecture, I deliberately bracketed the question of the internal
principles that ought to guide antidiscrimination law. I instead offered the
modest observation that there were important advantages to formulating
these principles in a manner that was cognizant of the insights that an
external perspective, like the sociological account, could bring to bear.
Particularly in light of Appiah's and Siegel's Responses, however, I should
add that, whatever the substance of these principles, they ought to reflect
genuine moral commitments. They ought to flow from a convincing social
vision that identifies which aspects of the social practices of race or gender
ought to be changed, and why. Although such principles would no doubt
be strengthened if formulated in light of the insights provided by Siegel's
concept of stratification, they can not be reduced to that concept. Stratifi-
cation is a term of descriptive analysis; it is not a moral purpose.
I suspect that if courts were to take seriously the insights of the
sociological account, they would recognize that antidiscrimination law
serves different purposes in different contexts. If one compares the role of
stratification in gender and in sexual orientation, for example, it is evident
that antidiscrimination law must combat very different social phenomena
in these two domains. It is plausible to expect these differences to affect
the moral vision pursued by the law. Tom Grey perhaps puts the matter
best when he notes that in articulating the objectives of the law we ought to
"take account of the nature of the enemy."' 8
17. Siegel. supra note 9. at 115.
18. Grey, supra note 1, at 70.
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